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The Blurry Boundaries Between War and 
Peace: Do We Need to Extend Just War Theory?
Abstract: Saint Augustine, being seen as one of the first just war theorists, famously stated 
that the true object of war is peace.1 And while just war theory is often said to be the leading 
position on the morality of war, today, it is struggling to keep up with the changing international 
reality. It is premised upon a certain conception of war – as armed conflict between two states 
– and on a clear demarcation line between the situation of war and the situation of peace. This 
however, seems to no longer fit the political reality. More often than not, we find ourselves in a 
grey area. This ‘new’ political reality, the changed character of war(fare), and the often blurry 
boundaries between war and peace, pose serious challenges to just war theory. This paper ana­
lyzes one solution: an extension of the bipartite conception of the theory. A branch called jus 
ante bellum, preventive peacemaking, is sometimes suggested to precede jus ad bellum. And jus 
post bellum, justice after the war, is the welcomed branch that could provide post war guidance. 
This paper explores what it means to adopt these branches. What does it bring us to extend the 
theory? It is presumed that it would benefit the goal of just war theory, that Augustine already 
pointed at: limiting war and realizing a ‘just and durable peace’. But is an extension really a good 
idea? There are several reasons why we should be careful to regard these arguably important 
issues within the parameters of just war theory.
Keywords: just war theory, new wars, jus ante bellum, jus post bellum, peace
1. Just War Theory’s ‘Struggle’ 
Just war theory is often said to be the leading position on the morality of war. The 
theory dates back to Greek and Roman antiquity and remains popular up to date. 
One can safely argue that this theory is significant and has proven sustainable.2 Its 
criteria appeal to moral intuitions widely held by many around the world. In the 
words of Michael Walzer, the leading contemporary just war theorist, just war is the 
theoretical version of ideas of our common heritage, “designed to help us resolve, 
or at least to think clearly about, the problems of definition and application”.3 Many 
1 Augustine, The City of God, 1950, Book XIX, 687, 688.
2 According to Larry May “It has stood the test of time”. See: Larry May, Eric Rovie, Steve Viner (ed.), The 
Morality of War. Classical and Contemporary Readings, 2006, ix. This does not mean that the theory was 
always popular to the same extent as today in history. 
3 Michael Walzer, Arguing about War, 2004, x.   
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theorists today accept the basic premises of just war theory;4 the theory is widely 
taught in universities and military academies; political leaders use its criteria to argue 
whether or not they undertake military action, and in general, they consider their 
armies restrained in war;5 and just war language is widely used in public debates. 
According to Alex Bellamy, there is “an ‘overlapping consensus’ around the just war 
tradition’s basic ideas”.6 
Located in between the two ‘extreme’ positions of pacifism and realism, just war 
theory provides principles with which to judge war. Contrary to realists, just war the­
orists believe that war is subjected to moral principles. As pacifists, they argue that this 
means that war is principally immoral, mainly because of the wrongfulness of the in­
tentional taking of human life – the killing of non­combatants in particular. But while 
just war theorists are reluctant to approve of war, they do think, contrary to pacifists, 
that there are situations in which a war can nevertheless be justifiable.7 To avenge a 
greater wrong, it is possible that the ends justify the means. In that case, war is per­
ceived as the ‘lesser’ of two evils.8 But while it is – at least theoretically9 – considered 
possible that a war is justified, the general goal of just war theory is a ‘just and durable 
peace’.10 It means that just war theorists are concerned with limiting the occurrence of 
war, and when it does occur, with ensuring that the conduct of war is as humane as 
possible.11 These concerns correspond with the two main branches of just war theory: 
jus ad bellum, determining under which conditions war is justified, and the jus in bello, 
determining what the proper behaviour is during a war. 
But while this theory might remain the leading position on the morality of war, 
there is another side to that story. Just war theory is in fact struggling to keep up with 
the changing international reality. It is premised upon a certain conception of war – 
as armed conflict between two states – and on a clear demarcation line between the 
situation of war and the situation of peace. And this seems no longer typical for the 
4 Jeff McMahan, “Just War”, in Robert Goodin, Philip Pettit and Thomas Pogge, A Companion to Contempo-
rary Political Philosophy, 2007, 669.
5 An excellent example is the 2009 Nobel Lecture by president Barack Obama ‘A Just and Lasting Peace’. In 
this speech, Obama defends just war theory and invokes its norms to explain the United States defense 
policy. See: http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obama­lecture_en.html. 
6 Alex Bellamy, Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq, 2006, 4.
7 Which does not mean that in general for just war theorists, war is considered as something good or 
properly just; in war, “justice is always under a cloud”. Walzer (footnote 3), x.
8 Bellamy (footnote 6), 3. 
9 For some, this is remains merely a theoretical possibility, a position called contingent pacifism. According 
to John Rawls: “The possibility of a just war is conceded but not under present circumstances.” See: John 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 1971, 382. Larry May argues that nearly all wars with just causes will nevertheless 
be unjust because of the (expected) failure to meet the proportionality principle. See: Larry May, After 
War Ends: A Philosophical Perspective, 2012. He calls this position contingent pacifism, a position which is 
criticized by Jeff McMahan: Jeff McMahan, Pacifism and Moral Theory, Diametros 23 (2010), 3–20. For a 
discussion of the different variations of contingent pacifism, see e. g. Andrew Fiala, The Just War Myth. The 
Moral Illusions of War, 2008, 163–168.
10 E. g. Mark Evans, Moral Responsibilities and the Conflicting Demands of Jus Post Bellum, Ethics & Inter-
national Affairs 23/2 (2009), 149 and May (footnote 9), 10.
11 Bellamy (footnote 6), 4.   
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political reality. Many agree that war itself and the way in which it is waged are differ­
ent today as compared to earlier in history.12 It is claimed that particularly since the 
end of the Cold War, the character of war has changed significantly. There is a large 
body of literature on this subject, an important part of which revolves around the 
debate on the so­called ‘old and new wars’.13 An important trend is that the number 
of wars between the armies of two states have declined since the Second World War, 
particularly since the early 1990s.14 These so­called ‘conventional wars’, commencing 
with a declaration of war, fought between two professional armies, and ending with a 
peace treaty, almost seem to have become a thing of the past. 
In many situations, it is not even clear whether something qualifies as war. The 
situation in Afghanistan, is that still a war? The operation in Mali? The drone attacks 
in Pakistan? The Russian presence in the Ukraine? In legal terminology, the term ‘war’ 
is abandoned. And contemporary wars (or armed conflicts; acts of war; or military 
actions) have many shapes and sizes: peace enforcement operations, military occu­
pation, the ‘war against terror’, airstrikes outside areas of war, guerrilla attacks and 
targeted killings. Obviously, it has become difficult to separate the paradigm of war 
and the paradigm of peace. More often than not, we find ourselves in a grey area. 
The decline of these conventional wars also means that there are different actors 
in contemporary wars, who play different roles and have different interests (e. g. finan­
cial, or control and power). The actors in wars are both state actors as well as non­state 
‘belligerents’ such as war lords, militias, mercenaries and private military companies.15 
The result is that some wars can be characterized as asymmetric, meaning that there is 
an imbalance of military strength between the belligerents, e. g. when non­state mili­
tias are fighting a guerrilla war against a national army.16 The growing involvement of 
non state actors in war makes it less likely that wars start after an official declaration 
made by state representatives at a given point in time. It is well possible that a period 
of civil unrest or rebellion develops – more fluently – into a situation that can qualify 
as war. And if the war starts with a political decision, who makes this decision? Politi­
cal representatives of the state, or of a different political entity, military leaders, a war 
lord? It appears that today’s wars are more likely to develop from the bottom, instead 
of top­down. The asymmetric character of contemporary wars and the fact that war 
is more and more commercialized – making it a potentially profitable endeavour for 
belligerents and other actors – furthermore means that the war can drag on (at a high 
or low intensity) for a long time.17 This also indicates that fewer wars have a clear be­
ginning and end today. 
12 For an overview of the nature of war throughout history see e. g. John Keegan, A History of Warfare, 1994. 
13 Important contributions to the debate are Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War, 1991, Herfried 
Münkler, The New Wars, 2004, and Mary Kaldor, New & Old Wars, 2007.
14 Human Security Center, Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century, 2006; Human Se­
curity Center, Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and The Shrinking Costs of War, 2011. 
15 The activities of these non­state actors blur the line between soldiers and civilians. See further: Kaldor 
(footnote 13), 9.
16 Münkler (footnote 13), 19–20.
17 Ibid, 21.   
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This political reality, the changed character of war(fare), and the often blurry 
boundaries between war and peace, pose serious challenges to just war theory. More 
specifically, it raises questions of relevance and applicability. Is just war theory still 
tailored for the ‘new’ political reality?18 Can we apply just war principles to contempo­
rary armed conflicts? Do they still offer the required moral guidance? 19 And perhaps 
most importantly, are they able to advance the goal of a just and durable peace? Being 
pessimistic, one could argue that these developments mean that just war theory is 
outdated and should be discarded. But it is worth exploring potential solutions to 
these challenges. 
This paper analyses one solution: an extension of the bipartite conception of just 
war theory. It is plausible that in the contemporary reality, just war theory has be­
come incomplete. The principles of the two existing branches are no longer sufficient 
to provide moral guidance and to realize the goal of a just and durable peace. There­
fore, in order to keep up with changing circumstances, many argue that just war the­
ory needs to be extended beyond the familiar jus ad bellum and jus in bello. In the last 
decade, arguments for incorporating one or two additional branches to complete just 
war theory are heard.20 There are other important issues, so it is argued, that should 
also be regulated by just war theory. Issues that are vital in limiting war and realizing 
a just and durable peace. The most common argument is that just war theory must 
be completed with a branch called jus post bellum.21 This branch could provide the re­
18 This critique is heard before at several points in history, for example during the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction, when the risk of a ‘total war’ which could not be limited in any way became a serious 
threat. As Evans points out, many thinkers thought this to be the end of just war theory because it was 
considered hopelessly outmoded and irrelevant. Mark Evans (ed.), Just War Theory: a Reappraisal, 2005, 
5, 6. 
19 For example, the discrimination principle means that in war, there is a morally relevant distinction be­
tween soldiers and civilians; combatants and non­combatants. In principle, non­combatants enjoy im­
munity; which means they must be spared from the violence of war. It is easy to understand that the 
application of this principle has become problematic in wars where it is difficult to make that distinction 
– e. g. when a national army fights irregular militias, who refrain from wearing uniforms and attack from 
within densely populated areas. Michael Walzer argues that the responsibility to discriminate and protect 
civilians can no longer fully be put on the national army fighting these militias. See further Walzer’s Tho­
mas More Lecture, War and Death: Reflections on the Just War Theory Today, 2007. 
20 Arguments for several additional branches are made. For example: Darrel Mollendorf and David Rodin 
argue that just war theory should consist of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, jus ex bello (governing the process 
of war termination and agreement on the terms of peace), and jus post bellum (governing the situations 
after the termination of the war); Mark Allman and Tobias Winright claim that the theory should consist 
of jus ante bellum (preventive peacemaking), jus ad bellum, jus in bello and jus post bellum; and Steven Lee 
argues that the theory should consist of jus in abolitione belli (the abolition of war altogether, overlapping 
with jus ante bellum), jus ad bellum, jus in bello, jus extendere bellum (the justice of the continuation of the 
war, overlapping partly with jus ex bello), and jus post bellum. In this article, I will focus on two common, 
and in light of the outlined changing circumstances the most relevant additional branches:, jus ante bellum 
and jus post bellum. I must acknowledge that jus ex bello would also be interesting to explore, however, that 
that is not undertaken in this article. See further: Darrel Mollendorf, Jus ex Bello, The Journal of Political 
Philosophy 16/2 (2008), 123–136; David Rodin, Ending War, Ethics and International Affairs 25/3 (2011, 
359–367); Steven Lee, Ethics and War. An Introduction, 2012; Mark Allman and Tobias Winright, After the 
Smoke Clears: The Just War Tradition and Post War Justice, 2010.
21 See e. g. Michael Schuck, When the Shooting Stops: Missing Elements in Just War Theory, Christian Cen-
tury III/30 (1994), 982, 983; Louis Iasiello, Jus Post Bellum: The moral responsibilities of victors in war,   
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quired guidance after the end of war. As Brian Orend argues: “Conceptually, war has 
three phases: beginning, middle and end.” Just war theory is therefore only complete 
when we include jus post bellum in the theory.22 But if ‘justice after war’ must be in­
cluded, should we then not consider ‘justice before the war’ as well? Just war theory 
can namely be extended both ways: at the end and at the beginning.23 A branch called 
jus ante bellum is sometimes suggested to precede jus ad bellum. This first additional 
branch is discussed in the second section. The second additional branch, jus post 
bellum, is discussed in the third section. This paper explores what it would mean 
to integrate these branches in just war theory. What can an extension of the theory 
bring us? An important advantage is that it is likely to benefit the general goal of just 
war theory: limiting war and realizing a ‘just and durable peace’. But is an extension 
really a good idea? We have to critically consider the question as to what should fall 
under the scope of just war theory. It will appear that there are several reasons why 
we should be careful to regard these arguably important issues within the parameters 
of just war theory. 
2. Jus Ante Bellum
The first potential branch regulates the situation prior to war and is often named jus 
ante bellum. Its norms apply in peacetime, in the absence of a particular war or threat 
of war. It that sense, it precedes jus ad bellum, which applies to the start of war. The 
content of what is proposed for this branch varies: jus ante bellum is proposed in order 
to train the armed forces and prepare for war in general; or it is proposed in order 
to prevent war from occurring at all. This latter conception of jus ante bellum is also 
referred to as jus in abolitione belli or ‘just peacemaking’. It is remarkable that this ad­
ditional branch, often titled jus ante bellum, is used to argue for the realization of two 
seemingly contrary goals: the preparation or prevention of war. 
Jus ante bellum is used in the preparatory sense to describe a branch of norms that 
regulate the general preparation for war. It deals with military policy and action before 
war, such as the maintenance of the armed forces, longer­term preparation for war and 
education and training of combatants.24 George Lucas argues that, together with jus 
Naval War College Review 3/4 (2004), 33–52; Richard DiMeglio, The Evolution of the Just War Tradition: 
Defining Jus Post Bellum, Military Law Review 186 (2005), 116–163; Camilla Bosanquet, Refining Jus Post 
Bellum, lecture at the International Symposium for Military Ethics, January 2007, available online: http://
isme.tamu.edu/ISME07/Bosanquet07.html; and Brian Orend, Jus Post Bellum: A Just War Theory Per­
spective, in Carsten Stahn and Jann Kleffner, Jus Post Bellum, Towards a Law of Transition From Conflict to 
Peace, 2008, 31–52.
22 Orend (footnote 21), 36.
23 This is referred to by Mark Allman and Tobias Winright as the ‘growing edges of just war theory’. See: 
Mark Allman and Tobias Winright, Growing Edges of Just War Theory: Jus ante bellum, jus post bellum, 
and Imperfect Justice, Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 32/ 2 (2012), 173–191.
24 Especially focused on the training of military personnel is Roger Wertheimer in: Roger Wertheimer, Em-
powering Our Military Conscience: Transforming Just War Theory and Military Moral Education, 2010.  
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post bellum, this branch completes just war theory. Jus ante bellum as he understands 
it “encompasses the appropriation of resources for military preparedness, training, 
and education of troops; provisions to develop requisite military leadership; appro­
priate management and oversight of military and defence apparatus; and the general 
preparedness for future war.”25 These are practical issues to do with the development 
and maintenance of a functioning defence system. According to Lucas such norms 
complete the conceptual circle because jus ante bellum also involves the planning of 
post war behaviour. Leaders should prepare for war, including a proper consideration 
of the implications of war and the exit­strategy. And similarly, combatants are trained 
both to ensure that they fight justly, and also that they conclude the war justly. When 
lessons are learned from the aftermath of war, which in turn infest considerations of 
jus ante bellum, the circle is complete.26 
What remains rather unclear in Lucas’ discussion of pre­war justice is the sub­
stance of this branch. Which type of norms are to govern these preparatory activi­
ties? It seems wise to properly consider the maintenance, education and training of 
the military. If wars occur, the soldiers that are deployed should be thoroughly in­
formed and trained on the rules of war and the protection of human rights. However, 
it seems that what Lucas’ understands to be preparatory jus ante bellum are simply 
practical guidelines that flow from jus in bello. The obligations of jus in bello namely 
demand commitment not only in war, but also before war, or even in the absence 
of a particular war. Military personnel is not educated and trained ‘on the spot’, but 
must be generally prepared for war in order to comply with jus in bello norms when 
they are deployed. For instance, the principle of discrimination requires that military 
personnel is educated on the rules of war, trained to distinguish military from civilian 
targets, and that they have weapons at their disposal with which they are able to make 
the distinction. This way, jus in bello norms require preparations for war in general 
during times of peace. These issues are therefore – in a sense – already part of just 
war theory’s moral framework. These preparatory activities entail nothing essentially 
different than the existing jus in bello responsibilities. This consequently means that 
jus ante bellum in the preparatory sense need not constitute an independent branch 
of just war theory. 
Others argue that jus ad bellum must be preceded by norms on preventive peace­
making – in an effort to prevent all war. Instead of preparing for war when there is 
not necessarily a particular occasion for war at hand, Allman and Winright state that 
jus ante bellum is concerned with reducing the chance that wars break out in the first 
25 George Lucas, Jus Ante and Post Bellum. Completing the Circle, Breaking the Cycle, in Eric Patterson 
(ed.), Ethics Beyond War’s End, 2012, 56.
26 Ibid, 58–60. And with the completion of this conceptual circle, the cycle of perpetual violence and war 
can be broken, according to Lucas. It appears that this way, his understanding of preparatory jus ante 
bellum tends towards preventive jus ante bellum. However, I find it hard to understand how he concludes 
that the cycle of war can be broken based on the presented reasoning.   
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place.27 This can be done by addressing the root causes of potential conflicts in the 
period before war. According to them, the two branches of jus ante bellum and just 
post bellum complete the ‘equation’ of just war theory. 28 This understanding of justice 
before the war is similar to Steven Lee’s proposal for an additional branch, which he 
titles jus in abolitione belli.29 He uses this term to refer to a branch of just war theory 
aimed at the prevention of all wars by formulating the right methods to abolish war. 
Lee proposes the following three criteria for jus in abolition belli: “maximize feasible 
non­military alternatives to achieving justice”, “bring greater legitimacy to interna­
tional institutions”, and “accept national sovereignty as a necessary moral fiction”.30 
The ‘just peacemaking ethic’, 31 which forms the basis of preventive jus ante bel-
lum, is more elaborate and provides us with ten practices of preventive peacemaking: 
‘support nonviolent direct action’, ‘take independent initiatives to reduce threat’, ‘use 
cooperative conflict resolution’, ‘acknowledge responsibility for conflict and injustice 
and seek repentance and forgiveness’, ‘advance democracy, human rights, and reli­
gious liberty’, ‘foster just and sustainable economic development’, ‘work with emerg­
ing cooperative forces in the international system’, ‘strengthen the United Nations and 
international efforts for cooperation and human rights’, ‘reduce offensive weapons and 
weapons trade’, and ‘encourage grassroots peacemaking groups and voluntary associ­
ations’.32 
Would it be possible to incorporate preventive jus ante bellum in just war theory? 
As preparatory jus ante bellum, preventive jus ante bellum is related to the other cri­
teria of just war theory. It flows from the jus ad bellum criteria of last resort and right 
intention; criteria which are particularly aimed at the limitation of war, and meant as 
a blockade against starting war. The above makes clear what type of norms are consid­
ered part of preventive jus ante bellum. And while they are related to other just war cri­
teria, they are not simply the concrete and practical guidelines to fulfill such criteria. 
Rather, they constitute a broad strategy to realize the abolition of war. As such, they 
entail something different than what is already part of just war theory. 
 Furthermore, unlike the two established branches of just war theory, jus ante bel-
lum does not apply to a particular war. This might be a problem when trying to incor­
porate this branch in the theory. Namely, the central idea to just war theory, dating 
back to Cicero, is that the ‘normal’ state of affairs is peace, and that war is an excep­
27 Mark Allman and Tobias Winright, After the Smoke Clears: The Just War Tradition and Post War Justice, 
2010, 7. 
28 Ibid, 10. 
29 Lee (footnote 20), 300.
30 Ibid, 300–306.
31 This ‘just peacemaking ethic’ can be integrated in just war theory as an additional branch, but can also be 
part of the pacifist position (depending on the position on what to do when peacemaking fails; can it be 
justified to wage war or is the nonviolence proscription absolute?), and it is also presented as alternative 
to pacifism and just war theory; i. e. as another paradigm. See further one of the most important spokes­
men of this position: Glen Stassen (ed.), Just Peacemaking: the New Paradigm for the Ethics of War and 
Peace, 1998.
32 Ibid and online at: http://justpeacemaking.org/the­practices/.   
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tion to that.33 In this exceptional state of affairs when the war is raging – this state of 
emergency – some of our most important moral principles are on hold. The premise 
of just war theory is that even this exceptional state of war is governed by certain 
moral norms, protecting the most essential values. However, jus ante bellum does not 
apply in this exceptional state of war. It applies in peacetime, dealing with the general 
practice of preventing war. But this problem might not be as serious as it appears. The 
introduction namely showed that today, it is not easy to separate the war­ and peace 
paradigm. The line between war and peace is often blurry in our contemporary world. 
Therefore, it might be might not be necessary to hold onto this strict temporal con­
ceptualization of just war theory.34 
And lastly, it is obvious that jus ante bellum is very much in line with just war theo­
ry, as it is particularly focused on the theory’s general goal: limiting war and realizing 
a just and durable peace. It therefore makes the achievement of this goal more likely 
and efforts to support this goal and realize the abolition of war from the world must be 
praised. These three reasons: the relationship with other branches; the blurry bound­
aries between war and peace, making the peacetime application less problematic; and 
the focus on the just war theory’s goal, constitute rather compelling arguments to in­
tegrate jus ante bellum in the theory. 
3. Jus Post Bellum
The second additional branch that is proposed is jus post bellum, ‘justice after war’. Jus 
post bellum should function as a moral framework regulating the situation after the 
war. Jus post bellum is used to refer to a either a body of legal or moral norms, or both, 
aimed at regulating the transition from war back to a ‘normal’ state of peace. As such, 
it provides a framework guiding political and military action, and it forms a standard 
which can be used to evaluate and judge particular post war situations. While many 
agree on the importance of a branch of jus post bellum in just war theory, there is no 
agreement on the content of such a branch. Often, the debate on jus post bellum is 
presented as a debate between two opposing positions: minimalism and maximal­
ism. Minimalists, as Michael Walzer, are said to endorse a restricted version of jus post 
bellum, as they are particularly concerned with respect for the sovereignty of states 
and limiting what victors are allowed to do after war. Maximalists, as Mark Evans, are 
concerned that victors will do too little after war. Consequently, they propose broader 
and more comprehensive obligations.35 
 The norms that are proposed could be roughly divided into different categories: 
safety and security; political justice; criminal justice; reparations/ compensation; 
33 Stephen Neff, War and the Law of Nations, A General History, 2005, 29–34.
34 It will however appear later in this article that this does in fact constitute a problem when trying to inte­
grate jus ante bellum.
35 The distinction between so­called minimalism and maximalism is explored in: Lonneke Peperkamp, Jus 
Post Bellum: A Case of Minimalism versus Maximalism?, Ethical Perspectives 21/3 (2014), 255– 288.  
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general reconstruction; and reconciliation.36 The first and foremost priority after war, 
acknowledged in all accounts of jus post bellum, is halting the aggression and ensuring 
safety and security in the war affected area. This has two components: guaranteeing 
international peace and security, through the consolidation of peace and the preven­
tion of future external aggression; as well as guaranteeing the security of the citizens 
of the defeated state itself, which means the prevention of future internal aggression.37 
This requires disarmament, arms control and the reintegration of soldiers in the so­
ciety.38 
Political justice encompasses norms regarding the influence on the political sys­
tem of the defeated state. Post war activities in this category are: institutional reform; 
legislative reform; reformation of the security sector; the realization of human rights; 
and replacement of (members of) the prior regime. In all proposals, political justice is 
part of jus post bellum. However, as pointed out earlier, there is considerable disagree­
ment on the proper scope of political justice after a war. The central question is: when 
and to what extent is coercive political change justified? There are different values 
which are at stake here: on the one hand international security and the protection of 
human rights, and on the other hand sovereignty of states and self­determination of 
peoples. It appears as if the character of the defeated regime determines when one set 
of values can overrule the other. This is true for most authors: the more unjust the re­
gime, the more likely it is that political reconstruction is justified. However, the turn­
ing point is different for all, and is dependent on the value that is attached to each of 
those values. E. g., for the ‘minimalist’ Walzer, sovereignty and self­determination are 
so important that political reconstruction of the defeated state is only allowed in case 
of inherently aggressive and murderous regimes.39 Orend, tending more towards max­
imalism, disagrees with Walzer. He does not attribute the same value to sovereignty 
and consequently, the turning point appears in a much earlier stadium, namely, when 
a state fails to be ‘minimally’ just.40 As result, political reconstruction of the defeated 
state is considered a post war obligation in a wider range of situations. 
The category of criminal justice entails norms on how to deal with international 
crimes that have occurred before and/ or during the war. Criminal justice can serve a 
variety of more specific goals, as retribution, deterrence of future crimes, closure for 
36 In the past years, many good pieces on jus post bellum appeared. In this article, I will focus on three of the­
se theorists, which also represent distinct positions on the subject: Michael Walzer (minimalism); Brian 
Orend (‘in between’); and Mark Evans (maximalism). 
37 The priority of these goals is highly dependent on the nature of the war or conflict. In case of a classic self 
defensive war the focus will be on international peace and security. In case of a civil war, the people of 
that war torn state form the main concern. But international security issues, like migration, international 
crime, and destabilization of the region, do demand attention in civil wars as well. 
38 Gary Bass, Jus Post Bellum, Philosophy & Public Affairs 32/4 (2004), 394.
39 Michael Walzer, The Aftermath of War. Reflections on Jus Post Bellum, in Eric Patterson (ed.), Ethics 
Beyond War’s End, 2012, 39.
40 Orend defines that as: “A minimally just community makes every reasonable effort to: (i) avoid violating 
the rights of other minimally just communities; (ii) gain recognition as being legitimate in the eyes of 
the international community and its own people; and (iii) realize the human rights of all its individual 
members,” Orend (footnote 21), 43.   
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the victims, fostering reconciliation; and symbolically reclaiming values. There are 
different instruments to establish individual criminal responsibility: e. g. through na­
tional trials, international criminal tribunals, the International Criminal Court, and 
truth and reconciliation commissions. Again, there are different values at stake, and 
this potentially makes this operation difficult. On one hand, the value of criminal jus­
tice – punishing the guilty – and the achievement of the above mentioned goals, and 
on the other hand the value of national and international peace and security. To put 
it shortly, this means that in some situations, a conflict can arise between justice and 
peace.41 While criminal justice is widely considered part of jus post bellum, disagree­
ment exists on the question of how to deal with such a conflict: should the value of 
justice be sacrificed when necessary in order to achieve peace? The proportionality 
principle, well known in just war theory, is invoked by some authors to determine the 
operation of norms within this category. According to Walzer and Orend, the punish­
ment of international crimes is subjected to such a proportionality test. This means 
that prosecution should be reconsidered if it extends the war, increases the casualties 
or endangers the peace.42 Walzer states: ‘sometimes security might require amnesties 
and public forgetfulness’.43 But other theorists argue that proportionality cannot func­
tion as a mediating factor here. The achievement of criminal justice is valued so highly 
that responsible individuals should always be held accountable in war crimes trials.44 
Reparations and compensation constitute the next category of jus post bellum 
norms. The specific goals here are both economic redistribution, which seeks to ma­
terially compensate the victims of aggression for inflicted damage, as well as psycho­
logical reparation, aimed at righting past wrongs in order to support the mental trans­
formation and to provide closure. Post war instruments falling in this category are 
the restitution of confiscated property, the extraction and payment of compensations, 
and formal apologies. The principle of proportionality can reappear here to determine 
the scope of reparations. When it does, it proscribes that the extracted reparations 
should not be overly punitive. Responsible people and/or the state must be realisti­
cally capable of paying the reparations.45 Sometimes it is perfectly clear who should 
return the property or who is responsible for compensation of that lost property or 
other inflicted damage. But it is not always easy to determine who is responsible and 
liable for damage done. And who then should pay for the reparations? Walzer and 
Orend disagree on this matter. According to Orend, we should discriminate when 
extracting reparations: only those who were responsible for the aggression should pay. 
Walzer however, argues that these reparations can be extracted from the citizens of the 
former aggressor state through a tax system. In that view, the people bear collective 
41 There is an extensive debate in the literature on this issue. I will only highlight the controversy here, and 
analyse the opinions of the discussed authors regarding this question in relation to jus post bellum only. 
42 Walzer (footnote 39), 45, Brian Orend, Justice after War, Ethics & International Affairs 16/1 (2002), 53.
43 Walzer (footnote 39), 45. 
44 E. g. Iasiello (footnote 21), 47–48 and DiMeglio (footnote 21), 153–158.
45 E. g. Brian Orend, The Morality of War, 2006, 166–167.  
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responsibility for the damage done by the aggression.46 Unlike the previous categories 
of jus post bellum, reparations and compensation are not an established part of jus post 
bellum. While that appeared to be so, in recent years some theorists, as ‘maximalist’ 
Mark Evans, argue that instead for extracting compensation, the victor must invest in 
the defeated state in order to foster reconstruction.47 In fact, Orend now also seems 
to argue against compensation, and instead on economic reconstruction. This means 
that the victor cannot extract reparations for damages done by the war, but must in­
stead invest in the defeated country, rebuilding its economy.48
The next category of jus post bellum is put forward particularly by so­called maxi­
malists. While safety and security; political justice (to a certain extent), and criminal 
justice (balanced in a certain way) seem to make up what can be called the ‘core’ of 
jus post bellum, general reconstruction consists of norms that are broader and more 
comprehensive. Therefore, they are often said to be part of maximalist jus post bellum. 
The category of general reconstruction entails obligations regarding economic recon­
struction and development,49 rebuilding infrastructure like road, rails and electrical 
grids,50 and cleaning up the environment. The fact that Evans and Orend stress the 
importance of economic reconstruction, and the related duty of the victor to take 
responsibility for their share of the material burdens, explain the rejection of compen­
sation on the part of the defeated highlighted above. 
The last category is also characteristic for the maximalist position. Forgiveness and 
reconciliation is not specifically recognized by minimalist accounts of jus post bellum. 
However, Evans argues that repairing the relationships between former enemies is 
an extremely important aspect of post war justice.51 Therefore, part of Evans’ jus post 
bellum is the obligation to “take full and proactive part in the ethical and socio­cultural 
processes of forgiveness and reconciliation that are central to the construction of a 
just and stable peace”.52 Because the obligation to achieve forgiveness and reconcilia­
tion seems very demanding, Evans argues that these concepts should be understood 
in thin, narrow terms: reconciliation “refers only to the business of developing means 
by which former enemies can live on the same planet without fighting each other”.53 
More theorists recognize the importance of reconciliation as part of jus post bellum. 
And while Evans interprets these obligations in a limited way, further reaching obliga­
tions are recognized by others.54
46 Walzer (footnote 39), 42.
47 Mark Evans, “Just Peace”: An Elusive Ideal, in: Eric Patterson (ed.) Ethics Beyond War’s End, 2012, 207–
208.
48 Orend (2012), 188.
49 Evans (footnote 48), 208 and Alllman and Winright (footnote 20), 160–163.
50 Evans (footnote 48), 207, 208; Allman and Winright (footnote 20), 161; and Orend (footnote 43), 52.
51 Evans (footnote 48), 210.
52 Evans (footnote 48), 208.
53 Ibid, 211.
54 Mark Allman and Tobias Winright for example, argue even stronger that reconciliation is a vital part of 
jus post bellum. They present a richer religious understanding of reconciliation. The main goal of recon­
ciliation is not only to make sure former enemies can continue to live on the same planet together, but 
to create relationships of respect, trust and friendship. “The reconciliation phase seeks to turn enemies   
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Would it be possible to incorporate jus post bellum in just war theory? As prepara­
tory jus ante bellum, jus post bellum is connected to the other criteria of just war theory. 
There are many ways in which the norms of jus post bellum are related with other just 
war norms. The category of criminal justice for example, directly flows from other jus-
tum bellum obligations. It determines how to deal with those guilty of violating jus ad 
bellum and those guilty of war crimes – violating jus in bello.55 And these activities, the 
investigation of crimes, prosecution and punishment of individuals is usually some­
thing turned to when the war is over. Furthermore, there are theorists that argue that 
jus post bellum in general is strongly related to just war theory. Walzer claims that fail­
ing to achieving a just peace after the war undermines good results from the war, even 
if the war itself can be called just (meaning that an unjust peace can undermine an 
otherwise just war).56 Thus, although there is no agreement on the exact influence, it 
is clear that there is a connection between jus post bellum and the other two branches. 
Furthermore, like preparatory jus ante bellum, jus post bellum applies in peacetime; 
not in the exceptional state of war but after the war. However, as noted above, that 
obstacle seems to have become quite irrelevant because of today’s blurry boundaries 
between war and peace. And this new political reality, in which the paradigm of war 
and peace can no longer be separated easily, and the character of war has changed, in 
fact shows the value of a branch of jus post bellum. Today, international military action 
is – more often than before – employed to protect the population of another state 
against grave human rights violations; to change an oppressive regime (and create a 
democracy); to stabilize so­called ‘failed states’; or a combination of such reasons. 
These considerations are different, and more comprehensive than was often the case 
earlier in history, or so it is argued.57 An important consequence of these comprehen­
sive aims is that a particular situation has to be realized after the war, and the bipartite 
conception of just war theory does not offer much guidance on this matter. Return to 
the status quo ante bellum as post war principle, which was part of traditional just war 
into friends and to bring emotional healing to the victims of war”. They stress that reconciliation is not 
about forgive­and­forget, but is instead is about true reconciliation between people, for which the truth is 
essential. Allman and Winright (footnote 23), 102. 
55 As Walzer states, if there was aggression, there must be aggressors and if war crimes were committed, 
there are war criminals. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustra-
tions, 2000, 287–288.
56 Orend agrees that there is a strong connection between the branches. He however points to something 
else, arguing that violating jus ad bellum automatically results in a failure to achieve jus post bellum. An 
unjust cause infects the conclusion of the war according to Orend. Walzer disagrees and states that after 
a debatable war (a premature pre­emption or misguided military intervention that topples tyrannical re­
gime) the war would remain unjust, but nevertheless, a just peace can be created post bellum. See: Walzer 
(footnote 3), 163 and Helen Frowe, The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction, 2011, 210.
57 Michael Walzer argues that the reconstruction of Germany and Japan after the Second World war was 
something new in the history of war. And also in the decennia after the Second World War, the goals of 
war were more limited than today. He mentions the example of the Gulf War: the war ended with the 
removal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait’s territory, and thus the restoration of the status quo ante bellum. No 
attempt was made to change the regime in place. Today’s wars, he argues, and especially humanitarian 
interventions, require something more after the war than the restoration of the situation that existed prior 
to the outbreak of the war. Walzer (footnote 3), 18–20.  
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theory, is not sufficient anymore. This shows why just war theory needs, now more 
than before, an additional branch of norms that apply after the war. 
And lastly, similar to jus ante bellum, jus post bellum would probably benefit the 
general goal of limiting war and ensuring a just and durable peace. A lack of post war 
norms could allow for ad hoc policy and measures, with the danger a so­called ‘victor’s 
justice’, in which the victor determines justice in his advantage. This leaves room for 
the political interests of the victorious state to determine post war conduct and to 
profit economically from the benefits of war. These activities are not helpful for the 
transition to a state of peace. In general, it seems that failure to plan a just post war 
situation can prolong the war, or lead to internal chaos after the war, failing of the state 
or the start of a civil war. These scenarios mean that the damage and casualties are 
increased. Planning an exit strategy based on norms of jus post bellum therefore means 
better prospects for a just peace. 
4. A Four Partite Just War Theory?
What do we envision for just war theory? If we acknowledge its value and refuse to 
discard just war theory altogether, it is worth trying to adapt just war theory so that 
it fits in with contemporary circumstances. When reflecting upon this ‘new’ political 
reality, in which just war theory needs to realize its goal – limiting war and realizing a 
just and durable peace –it appears as if an extension of just war theory is a sensible way 
to ‘modernize’ just war theory. A prima facie case for a four partite just war theory was 
presented in the second and third paragraph of this paper. Both jus ante bellum and jus 
post bellum turned out to be related to the other branches of the theory, even though 
these additional branches do not simply consist of practical guidelines to realize these 
existing principles. Rather, they flow from traditional just war theory, but nevertheless 
constitute independent criteria. Furthermore, while they apply in peacetime, and are 
in that sense at odds with jus ad bellum and jus in bello, this might not pose a serious 
problem precisely in light of today’s blurry boundaries between war and peace. Since 
a clear demarcation between those two paradigms can rarely be made, it is no longer 
necessary to strictly adhere to this distinction. Also, the general goal of just war theory 
could greatly benefit from an extension of just war theory. Although jus ante bellum 
and jus post bellum apply in peacetime, all four branches aim to limit war: jus ante 
bellum aims at general prevention, jus ad bellum limits the number wars, jus in bello at 
limits the damage, and jus post bellum aims at peacemaking, reconstruction and pre­
vention. While jus ante bellum is strictly forward looking in character, jus post bellum 
is mainly backward looking, since it deals with things that happened right before and 
during the war. In some respects, the latter is also forward looking, as e. g. political 
reconstruction and the prevention of future wars are essential for jus post bellum. We 
could indeed say that these four branches are not neatly separated. Rather, each of 
them flows into the next. When jus post bellum deals with peacemaking, reconstruc­
tion and prevention, it eventually flows into jus ante bellum, indeed closing the circle.   
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However, despite these arguments, and the praiseworthy efforts to integrate 
norms on preventive peacemaking and post war reconstruction and peacemaking 
into just war theory, difficulties will come up when trying to integrate these additional 
branches. These difficulties relate to various elements: the character of the norms; the 
addressees/ duty bearers; the content; and the foundation. Before welcoming these 
new branches, we must seriously consider these – at the very least. 
First, the character of jus post bellum is – to a certain extent – similar to the two 
established branches. While it deals with rather concrete areas of post war justice, the 
norms that are put forward are not entirely different from the traditional ones. For 
a large part, jus post bellum consists of moral norms regulating a particular post war 
situation. For example, if jus in bello insists on upholding certain rules, violations of 
these rules must be prosecuted, although the value of justice and the value of peace 
must be balanced using the proportionality principle, well known in just war theory. 
The character of jus ante bellum however, seems different from the other branches. The 
proposed norms are not abstract moral rules or principles but this branch consists 
rather of general strategies to prevent war. Jus ante bellum reflects the best methods 
and practices to prevent wars from breaking out, such as strengthening international 
organizations and reducing weapons trade. 
The second difficulty that needs to be considered regards the addressees of the 
additional branches. Who are the duty bearers? Similar to jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello norms, which are addressed to the (would be) belligerents – the parties that are 
involved in the war – jus post bellum primarily addresses the (former) belligerents. Post 
bellum obligations are generally assigned to the states that took part in that war.58 On 
these states, the obligation rests to fulfil these duties, such as the creation of a certain 
level of safety, the responsibility to reconstruct a war torn society and the achieve­
ment of criminal justice, even though admittedly, this branch need not be exclusively 
directed at the belligerents. While the first and foremost responsibility to fulfil jus post 
bellum rests on the former belligerents, it is plausible that other parties – states that 
were not directly involved in the war or international organizations – assist in post 
bellum activities. Walzer e. g. strongly argues that the burdens of reconstruction need 
to be wider distributed, for example in the situation of Iraq.59 And Walzer is not the 
only one arguing that post bellum obligations are not exclusively assigned to the bel­
ligerents, but that this branch is characterized by collective, international obligations, 
assigned e. g. according to the ability to fulfil these obligations.60 Still, jus post bellum 
remains primarily focused on the parties that were involved in the war.61
58 There is some disagreement on the distribution of these responsibilities between the victorious and the 
vanquished. Some argue that the post bellum norms apply differently and some argue that these responsi­
bilities need to be – in principle – shared between the involved parties. See further e. g. May (footnote 9), 
14–19.
59 Walzer (footnote 3), 167, 168.
60 Eric Patterson, Jus Post Bellum and the Responsibility to Rebuild, British Journal of Political Science 
(2013), 1–27.
61 See further: Lenneke Peperkamp, On the Duty of Reconstruct After War: Who is responsible for jus post 
bellum?, Canadian Journal of War & Jurisprudence (2016), 403–430.  
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This is not true for jus ante bellum; those duties cannot be addressed at dis cernible 
actors. Rather, it seems that the international community in general would be respon­
sible for realizing this branch. The problem that arises here is that jus ante bellum du­
ties, as well as potentially some jus post bellum duties, are considerably less determi­
nate than jus ad bellum and jus in bello duties. The specific duty bearers are namely 
hard to identify. The fact that there is less agreement on the specific norms of these 
additional branches, than these of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, only reinforces that. 
Which state or international organization should take up the responsibility to comply 
to these rather indeterminate duties? Compliance is a already a serious concern for 
just war theory’s established branches, but this problem is only increased by integrat­
ing such indeterminate norms. Walzer acknowledges this concern, referring in this 
context to the ‘collective action problem’. When we might be inclined to think that 
post bellum justice is better served by multilateralism (even if the ad bellum decision 
was unilateral) it is still questionable that post bellum obligations are better fulfilled 
when taken up collectively.62 As a result, integrating these additional branches into 
the theory, especially jus ante bellum, brings with it problems of indeterminacy which 
decreases its clarity and consistency, and therewith its feasibility. This makes it really 
difficult to identify jus ante bellum as a viable part of just war theory. 
Third, the content of jus ante bellum is different from the content of the other 
branches of just war theory. This becomes clear when we examine the application of 
modern just war theory. Earlier in this article, it appeared that it is not problematic 
that jus ante bellum and jus post bellum actually apply in peacetime, because the line 
between war and peace is often blurry in our contemporary world. In the grey zone 
between war and peace it can be hard to determine whether a particular situation 
qualifies as ‘war’; and when this war begun and ended. Therefore, it is argued, just war 
theory should cover the whole of such situations. However, with this difficulty to de­
marcate the time of war from the time of peace arises the difficulty to determine which 
branch of just war theory is applicable. It could be argued that in situations like this, 
we should be flexible in the application of just war theory, e. g. using just war theory 
without there being an ‘official war’, or applying two branches at the same time. For 
example, it would seem useful to apply jus in bello norms together with norms of jus 
post bellum when the war is ‘officially’ over, but large scale violence remains, such as 
the situation in Afghanistan. For this reason, we could assume that the strict temporal 
conceptualization of just war theory is no longer the best way to understand the op­
eration of modern just war theory. We should change our perspective and understand 
just war theory as applicable to the exceptional practice of war, not to the time of war.63 
It is the activities that need to be justified. The branches do not regulate specific peri­
ods in time, but rather war related activities. And while these activities do usually take 
62 Walzer (footnote 39), 41, 42.
63 Seth Lazar similarly argues in an unpublished working paper that the different branches regulate specific 
practices instead of that they are separated by an ‘arbitrary timeline’. See: Seth Lazar, Endings and Af­
termath in the Ethics of War, CSSJ Working paper, 13. Online at: http://social­justice.politics.ox.ac.uk/
materials/SJ016_Lazar_Endings&Aftermath_War.pdf.   
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place during a certain period, they are not confined to them. This conceptualization 
of just war theory, that Jann Kleffner dubs the functional conceptualization,64 creates 
room for the required flexible and overlapping application of justum bellum norms. 
But what activities are regulated by the additional branches? When assessing their 
content, it is clear that while jus post bellum indeed deals with war related activities, 
jus ante bellum does not.65 On the contrary, jus ante bellum does not have anything to 
do with the issue of war, as it arises not in the context of a particular war but offers a 
strategy to foster peace. This functional conceptualization of just war theory therefore 
reveals that while the content of jus post bellum matches the theory, the content of jus 
ante bellum is entirely different. 
A fourth difficulty for both jus ante bellum and jus post bellum is that, although they 
are both related to the other branches, it is questionable whether their foundation can 
be located in just war theory. Because jus ad bellum and jus in bello apply in that excep­
tional state of war, it is governed by certain moral norms, protecting the most essen­
tial values. This ‘core’ of fundamental norms is the radically dressed down version of 
what could be simply called our ‘normal morality’. For example, while the intentional 
killing of other human beings is almost universally considered morally wrong, this can 
be justified in times of war. And while it can be justified as inherent part of war, just 
war theory tries to regulate this by proscribing that attacks must be proportional to 
the military goal aimed for, and by proscribing that only deliberate attacks on combat­
ants are justified.66 Now the fact that jus ante bellum and jus post bellum apply to future 
and past activities in peacetime – outside that emergency situation – suggests that it 
is inadequate to ground the norms in the limited moral framework of just war theory, 
determined by the exceptional state of war. The foundation of the norms is located in 
that ‘normal morality’, consisting of general principles of justice based on e. g. global 
justice, international political morality, cosmopolitanism and/ or human rights. Wal­
zer argues that: “Democratic political theory, which plays a relatively small part in 
our arguments about jus ad bellum and in bello, provides the central principles of this 
account (post war justice). They include self­determination, popular legitimacy, civil 
rights, and the idea of a common good.”67 
Seth Lazar makes a similar, rather convincing argument against integrating jus ante 
bellum and jus post bellum. He claims that: ‘In the period before a threat is raised, we 
64 “In such a conceptualization (with functionality as the leitmotiv), it would be the facts on the ground that 
determine whether and to what extent jus post bellum starts or ceases to apply, and which of its constituent 
elements.” Jann Kleffner, Towards a Functional Conceptualization of the Temporal Scope of Jus Post 
Bellum, in Carsten Stahn, Jennifer Easterday, Jens Iverson (ed.), Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative 
Foundations, 2014, 296.
65 In this, I disagree with Seth Lazar, who argues that jus post bellum does not regulate the same aspects as jus 
ad bellum and jus in bello, but the practice of peace building. I am however inclined to think that jus post 
bellum applies to war related activities, since most issues that are regulated are direct consequences of the 
war, for example criminal prosecution, compensation and political reconstruction. 
66 This conception of jus in bello is today challenged by so called ‘revisionists’. See e. g. Jeff McMahan, 
Kolling in War, 2009.
67 Walzer (footnote 3), 164.   
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should follow the full gamut of moral reasons, not this polarised set.’68 Indeed, jus ante 
bellum cannot be reduced to the moral framework of just war theory. It is obvious 
that its limited framework sufficient as foundation for duties as: ‘advance democracy, 
human rights, and religious liberty’; ‘foster just and sustainable economic develop­
ment’; and ‘strengthen the United Nations and international efforts for cooperation 
and human rights’.69 This is only partially true for jus post bellum. Jus post bellum is 
mainly backward looking as most of its duties are related to (a violation of) jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello norms, as the example of criminal justice proves: these norms 
are backward looking in that they are directly related to crimes committed before and 
in the war. Also, reparations and compensation are directly related to the war; they 
are owed when e. g. property is seized or destroyed in war. Since a substantial part 
of the post bellum norms and duties directly flow from the war, it is plausible that its 
norms are grounded in just war theory’s moral framework. However, this framework 
is an insufficient foundation to guide the more extensive, forward looking post bel-
lum norms. For example, general principles of justice come into play when consid­
ering comprehensive political reconstruction, as Walzer and Lazar rightly argue. The 
broader and more comprehensive post war obligations are understood, and thus the 
more maximalistic the interpretation of jus post bellum is, the more obvious the shift to 
general principles of justice is and the connection to just war theory is loosened. The 
broad post war activities of economic reconstruction; rebuilding infrastructure; and 
fostering reconciliation cannot be grounded in the limited moral framework of just 
war theory. These activities are therefore inevitably guided by the full range of moral 
reasons, however those are understood.70 If these additional branches are meant to be 
fully integrated, just war theory can no longer be separated from general theories of 
justice. And when general principles of global justice, international political morality, 
cosmopolitanism and/ or human rights are integrated into the theory, the indetermi­
nacy is complete.71
Conclusion
We can conclude that while arguments for an extension of just war theory into a four 
partite conception appear strong, we should reconsider adopting these two addi tional 
branches. Conceptually, jus ante bellum does not fit into just war theory, as it is a gener­
al strategy consisting of guidelines as opposed to moral norms; the regulated activities 
and the addressees deviate from the established branches; and the foundation must be 
located entirely outside just war theory. While it was expected that the general goal of 
68 Lazar (footnote 63), 22.
69 http://justpeacemaking.org/the­practices/. 
70 Lazar (footnote 63), 22.
71 Cécile Fabre notes that this would only make just war theory richter, which opens the way for including 
maximalist jus post bellum. Cécile Fabre, War’s Aftrmath and the Ethics of War, in Setz Lazar and Helen 
Frowe (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethics of War, forthcoming 2016.  
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just war theory – realizing a just and durable peace – would benefit from an integration 
of jus ante bellum, the contrary would be true. While jus ante bellum provides praise­
worthy guidelines in an effort to prevent wars, they seem to be too indeterminate, ide­
alistic and demanding compared to traditional just war theory. Jus ante bellum, as it is 
now understood, could therefore hardly be perceived as realistically attainable part of 
just war theory. And aside from the conceptual difficulties and the infeasibility, adopt­
ing jus ante bellum would run the general risk of inflating just war theory as a whole. 
Integrating norms on preventive peacemaking entails a substantial expansion of the 
theory. And the more issues are integrated, the more drastic and fundamental this 
expansion will be. The risk of inflating just war theory, with a considerate devaluation 
of the theory as a whole as result, is significant and must be acknowledged.
These arguments against integrating jus ante bellum are not entirely valid for jus 
post bellum. Jus post bellum fits better into the concept of just war theory. The character 
and the content of the norms is similar; the addressees are primarily those who took 
part in the war (while an involvement of other states or organizations is also possible); 
and the foundation can be located in just war theory, although general principles of 
justice creep in. Jus post bellum seems to have one foot in just war theory and one foot 
out. What turns out to be relevant here is the way how jus post bellum is interpreted. 
A minimalist jus post bellum is more tightly connected to just war theory than a max­
imalist jus post bellum. The more comprehensive post bellum norms are considered to 
be, the further this branch conceptually drifts away from the just war paradigm, and 
the less realistically attainable it appears to be. Therefore, the idea of integrating only a 
limited, minimalist account of jus post bellum into the theory sounds convincing. This 
way, just war theory is more ‘complete’ in offering the required moral guidance in the 
contemporary political reality while at the same time conceptually leaving just war 
theory intact, and minimizing the risk of inflating and devaluating the theory. This 
by no means reduces the importance of the issues regulated by jus ante bellum and 
maximalistic jus post bellum. It merely means that these issues should not be regarded 
within the parameters of just war theory but rather, should be perceived from the wid­
er perspective of global justice or an ‘ethics of peace building’. 
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